On May 24, 2010, 800 soldiers and 370 police officers stormed into Tivoli Gardens, an impoverished district in the capital of Jamaica. Their aim was to restore state authority in this part of Kingston and to arrest Christopher "Dudus" Coke, who was wanted for extradition to the United States on drug and arms trafficking charges. The incursion was the culmination of nine months of national political turmoil. The first aim was achieved, but the second was not, and only at great cost. Around 70 civilians and three members of the security forces were killed. The authors constituted a small group of international forensic pathologists who, at the request of the Public Defender and over a four-week period from mid-June, observed the autopsies of the civilians. This paper describes some of the outcomes of this work, set within the evaluation of the incursion by the Commission of Enquiry. The Enquiry concluded there was evidence of at least 15 extrajudicial killings and was highly critical of many other aspects of the operation and its aftermath. Acad Forensic Pathol. 2017 7(3) 
INTRODUCTION
Jamaica is an island nation in the Caribbean Sea, south of Cuba and west of the island of Hispaniola (divided between Haiti and the Dominican Republic). Jamaica was discovered and claimed for Spain by Christopher Columbus in 1494 and taken by the English, finally, in 1655. It achieved independence in 1962, but remains in the British Commonwealth. It is a parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy with a Governor General representing the Queen. Its population in 2010 was 2.6 million, 90% of whom claim mainly African descent (1) .
Jamaica has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Of countries with more than 100 homicides, and with data available for 2012, Jamaica had the sixth highest homicide rate at 39.3/100 000 population (2) . In 2006, with 1674 homicides, the rate was 58/100 000, and possibly in that year the world's highest. The death penalty was reaffirmed by Parliament in 2008, although it is not used.
Civil disturbance of a degree has been a feature of Jamaican history. In 1865 (slavery having been abolished in 1835), there was a protest march by the impoverished black population ruthlessly put down by the Governor, Edward John Eyre. The Governor declared martial law and sent in troops. Several hundreds of the population were subsequently killed as they were hunted down, arrested, and executed without recourse to what, even then, was regarded as proper process. A subsequent Royal Commission in England found that the Governor acted with-"commendable promptitude but unnecessary rigour"-words that resonated with the evaluation of the events in 2010 (3).
In 1938, there were labor riots and 15 deaths. In 2001, 27 civilians were killed in an event involving police in Tivoli Gardens, the same location as the current event. There is a British trained Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) and Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). Together, these are referred to as the security forces.
The title of this paper refers to the reestablishment of state authority in West Kingston/Tivoli Gardens by the Jamaican security forces in May 2010 as an "incursion." According to the Public Defender, this is how it was popularly known, although he thought it could more accurately be described as a siege (4) .
DISCUSSION

Background to the West Kingston/Tivoli Gardens Incursion
Christopher "Dudus" Coke
Christopher "Dudus" Coke was regarded as the preeminent Don in Jamaica. His base was in Tivoli Gardens, in the Prime Minister's electorate. Tivoli Gardens had a population in 2010 of approximately 10 000 including, in the words of one witness to the subsequent Commission of Enquiry, "a cadre of uneducated, unemployed and unemployable young people" (5) . They depended on the patronage of Coke for their livelihood. His father before him had led a gang in Tivoli Gardens. Coke took the title "President," he led the "Presidential Click," and his girlfriend was popularly known as "The First Lady." His gang had reach into other parts of Kingston and Jamaica through a less cohesive transnational organized crime network called the "Shower Posse," and had overseas affiliates in Tampa, Miami, Ohio, and the UK. His criminal enterprise involved drug trafficking, arms trafficking, robbery, extortion, and kidnapping.
Tivoli Gardens -"A State Within a State"
The Commissioner of Police described Tivoli Gardens under Coke as a state within a state. It was also called a garrison community created by large scale housing developments allocated by the state to supporters of the party in power. These partisans then pushed out the minority from within and guarded against invasion from outside; the expelled set up a squatter community. Utility companies could not go in to the community to collect outstanding money, effectively making utilities free in Tivoli Gardens. Coke himself collected payment for these services.
INVITED REVIEW
For 30 years before, police testified at the Commission of Enquiry, the JCF was unable to undertake regular policing in Tivoli Gardens. No police station had been situated there for many years. This was a recognition of the danger to police involved in having a presence there. A Commission of Enquiry had been held into a bloody confrontation between the security forces and the residents of Tivoli in 2001, resulting in 27 deaths. How they met their deaths was never established. No one was held legally or administratively accountable. (7) . In addition, 10, 19, and 12 police officers, respectively, died during the course of JCF operations in each of those years, almost all by gunshot wounds (8) . Also, over this period there were many other individual events of violence including attacks on police stations and when one of Coke's brothers was killed in 2005.
The Extradition Request
On August 24, 2009, the heads of the security forces received information that the United States government was actively seeking Coke's extradition from Jamaica. They immediately informed the Prime Minister, Mr. Golding, the leader of the Jamaica Labour Party government. Almost immediately, according to intelligence, Coke fled his luxury compound in regional Jamaica and went to his base in Tivoli Gardens. The government took nine months to authorize his extradition, during which time public anxiety and unrest increased.
The Prime Minister referred to legal and constitutional issues in the extradition request leading to the considerable delay. The existence of these issues was subsequently confirmed by a special Commission of Enquiry convened in October 2010 to consider all the issues surrounding the request (9) . As time passed, the US began refusing visas, amongst other actions, for members of the government wishing to travel to the US. Civil society groups became active. The opposition discovered a $400 000 USD payment to a US law firm to lobby in Washington against the extradition. When challenged with this, the Prime Minister responded that the money was paid by the Jamaica Labour Party, not by the government. This fact was also verified by the special Commission of Enquiry, which was very critical of the payment, saying that it was inappropriate for the Prime Minister to arrange such a thing (9) . Eventually, the Prime Minister apologized in Parliament. Then, without giving the security forces any advance notice, he announced agreement to the extradition in a national address on public television on May 17, 2010. This was regarded by his opponents as effectively signalling the agreement to Coke, thus giving him time to disappear.
The main Commission of Enquiry concluded that it was imprudent of the Prime Minister not to give the security forces notice of his intended announcement that Coke was to be arrested; they should not have learned of this through the media (10) . But the Commission made no formal adverse finding of the Prime Minister in this regard; he readily acknowledged merit in the point. The Commission was critical of the Commissioner of Police for not telling the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Security that it was important that they had some advance notice of the government's intention to act.
The Nine Months Between the Request and the Incursion
The security forces stated that they used the ninemonth delay to plan the joint operation for Coke's arrest. Although it was referred to as a "joint operation," each force developed its own plan. The Commission of Enquiry found that neither heads of the JDF and
INVITED REVIEW
JCF knew of the other's plans, although other officers did. The basic tasks were for the JDF to secure the sectors and then invite JCF to enter and conduct searches and other tasks appropriate for the civil power. The Commission of Enquiry was highly critical of the quality of planning and its implementation (see below).
Coke used the period… …to amass a substantial armoury and recruit a large number of mercenaries to protect him from arrest" (11 (14) .
Sandbags were also used as firing positions. The Commission concluded that amongst Coke's men were some with military experience to help plan and build the barricades. In addition, the National Intelligence Bureau had photographs of men piling sandbags in bulletproof vests, wearing night vision goggles, and carrying rifles.
On May 18, people were in the streets of the capital, Kingston, demonstrating in favor of Coke and paralyzing the city. On May 20, 600 women dressed in white held a demonstration with placards saying variously, "Leave Dudus alone," "Next to God is Dudus," and "We will die for Dudus."
Matters came to a head on Sunday May 23. Criminal elements launched a series of attacks against police stations in West Kingston and related areas. These attacks were of such intensity that the heads of the security forces sought and obtained an urgent meeting of the Cabinet of Jamaica. The deteriorating security situation was explained to the Cabinet, which authorized the declaration of the State of Emergency (11).
The attacks resulted in two police stations being totally destroyed by fire and a third being extensively damaged; a fourth was damaged by gunfire and other assets such as vehicles were damaged.
In the words of the Commission,
Resisting arrest and extradition had morphed into an open and violent assault against the State of Jamaica and its law enforcement agencies (15).
The next day, May 24, 2010, the security forces moved into West Kingston.
The Incursion
Approximately 800 soldiers of the JDF and 370 officers of the JCF were involved in the operation.
The advance of the security forces was slowed, and in some instances halted, by the ferocity of the resistance. Explosions, gunfire, and smoke could be heard and seen over the city. It took until around 4 pm on May 24 before the Tivoli Gardens area was secured. It was clear that Coke had fled, if he was ever there at the beginning. By the next day, there were reports of hundreds dead; people phoned in to the radio with reports of brutality, including throwing people off roofs. There was sporadic gunfire in other areas of West Kingston over the next few days. By the end of the week, 73 deaths were reported. (16) .
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The Investigation of Deaths In Jamaica
The death investigation system is governed by the Coroners Act 1900 and the Registration (Births and Deaths) Act 1881. Only three of 34 sections in the Coroners Act relate to forensic pathology and/or the management of bodies. The Act covers a dead body that appears to have died a violent or unnatural death, has died a sudden death of which the cause is unknown, when a medical certificate of the cause of death is not forthcoming, or when the person has died in prison.
In these cases, a coroner, justice, or designated police officer can direct any duly qualified medical practitioner to undertake a postmortem examination of the body.
There is no national Jamaican forensic pathology service. In Kingston in 2010, there were two overseas trained doctors who formed the Medico-Legal Unit of the Ministry for National Security who undertook the autopsies in the capital. At this time, homicide victims were being stored for approximately three months prior to autopsy because of the high number of homicides and the dearth of pathologists.
In 2010, all aspects of the forensic pathology system were under severe strain, underresourced, and thus not operating effectively. In addition, the coroner system was ineffective and the investigation of the deaths following the "incursion" into West Kingston/Tivoli Gardens was undertaken by the Public Defender, a small ombudsman type office, and The Bureau of Special Investigations (BSI). The role of the latter was criminal investigations, and this was taken over by the newly established Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) in November 2011 (see below).
In the absence of other effective mechanisms, the Public Defender's Office was frequently involved on behalf of members of the public in criminal investigations. The focus in this role is to… …seek redress (ranging from money compensation to an apology) for the victims of abuse or estate -particularly in the case of extra-judicial killings (17) .
The Public Defender, Mr. Earl Witter, a barrister by background, acknowledged how ill-equipped he and his office was to undertake the task of investigating the incursion. But he thought even this was better than involving the coroner system. He wrote in his Interim Report to Parliament as follows:
With the greatest respect, to commit those deaths to the hands of coroners therefore would be to condemn and inhume the deaths in a veritable sinkhole. But worse, the resort to inquests would condemn the Government to reasonable suspicion of seeking to cover up alleged wide-scale atrocities as well as deny timely enquiry into the matters adumbrated herein (18).
Introduction
In the weeks following the incursion, the international community, including the United Nations Develop-INVITED REVIEW ment Programme (UNDP), were very concerned. The difficulties in Jamaica were well-known. Following enquiries from the Public Defender, the UNDP sought the assistance of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) to form a group of international forensic pathology observers to independently record the results of postmortem examinations conducted by the Jamaican authorities. Ultimately, the authors were assembled into this group. The examinations were to be undertaken only when the international observers were present. One of us (MSP) had considerable experience already in the Caribbean and was the first observer to attend.
He arrived in mid June and immediately struck difficulty when he started observing autopsies. On the first day of the examinations, ten cases were examined in such a way that it was not possible for him to be sure of the observations, let alone record them in an acceptable fashion. The examinations were occurring in two rooms at the same time with some dissections being undertaken without the pathologist or the observer being present, so he sought the intervention of the Public Defender. The outcome was an agreed protocol between the observer pathologist and the Jamaican pathologist. The provisions of the autopsy components of the United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (1991) formed the basis of this agreed protocol (19) . Better known as the Minnesota Protocol, this has recently been completely revised and updated (20) .
The specific terms were then formalized in a memorandum from the Minister for Security as set out in Appendix 1. A pro forma observer report, developed by one of us (MSP) in accordance with this protocol, and used by all the observers, is set out in Appendix 2.
Over four weeks, the four observers attended and provided pro forma reports for 73 postmortem examinations undertaken by the Jamaican pathologists. The reports produced by the Jamaican pathologists were provided directly to the BSI, whereas the observer reports were provided to the Public Defender. The information in Tables 1 to 4 is therefore based on the observer reports only.
The Number of Deceased
The observers, it has become clear with the passage of time, did not see all deaths associated with the events in West Kingston/Tivoli Gardens. First, there were a number of deceased (perhaps three to four according to the Commission of Enquiry) regarded by the BSI as having been killed by gunmen before the incursion. Supt. Brown gave evidence about four burnt bodies that she corresponded with the Public Defender who gave permission on July 4 for them to be buried. Supt. Brown said: (22) .
Notwithstanding this, the Commission formally concluded, however, that there was no good evidence that gunmen killed residents of Tivoli Gardens (23) .
Secondly, the three deceased security force members (one soldier and two policemen) were not subject to autopsies that involved the observers. It is not clear from the Commission of Enquiry report if they had autopsies at all.
For the purposes of this paper, there are two main lists of deceased. The first is the list of 76 deceased, headed "State of Emergency 2010 -List of known related deceased," set out in the Public Defender's Interim Report of 2013 (24), and adopted by the Commission of Enquiry (25) . This first list is by name, sex, age, occupation, and address (without the ground zero [GZ] body reference number). The five unidentified decedents on this list do include the "GZ" number. The second is the authors' list of 73 deceased (including seven unidentified at the time of examination) whose autopsies we observed and have both the name, if known, and the GZ reference number. The apparent discrepancies between these two lists are as follows: two of the seven unidentified on the authors' list of 73 were subsequently identified, reducing to five the number unidentified; there were four named deceased on the list of 76 who were not on the authors' list of 73. All the unidentified bodies on the list of 76 were also present on our list of 73. This means that there were at least four deceased, who probably received autopsies, which we did not observe. There may be reasons for this, including the possibility that the deaths may have occurred after our involvement; there was only one of the 73 deceased seen by the observers that was not on the list of 76 bodies. This was an HIV-positive female, who suffered a very superficial gunshot graze to the knee requiring dressing who died in hospital from Pneumocystis pneumonia some weeks later. The observer did not feel that her death could properly be attributed to the "incursion." There is, thus, an obvious reason why she was omitted from the list of 76. 
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Identification of the Bodies
Over the 10 to 14 days following the operation, the bodies underwent an identification process largely involving families viewing photographs of the deceased. Such identification was supplemented by a member of the deceased's family attending the mortuary to identify the deceased to the pathologist. The pathologist would question the family member about any antemortem identifying information (e.g., scars, tattoos) and about the family member's understanding of the circumstances of the death. Immediately prior to autopsy, the family member was brought into the autopsy room and asked to identify the deceased, usually with specific reference to the previously discussed antemortem information. This was often extremely distressing for family members (and for everyone else). This was the way in which most of the 66 deceased were identified; seven remained unidentified at the time of the observed autopsies, two of which were subsequently identified.
The Public Defender's interim report refers to four cases of missing persons.
Nine bodies had to be re-autopsied because their name tags, after identification by relatives, had disintegrated or become unreadable. The purpose of the re-autopsy was to compare the observed injuries with the reports of previous autopsies to re-establish identity.
In all cases where deceased were not identified, a cross section of femur was retained.
The Nature of the Deaths and Possible Extra Judicial Killings
The public defender in his interim report included a list of 44 complaints of alleged extrajudicial killings set out by name, sex, age, occupation, and address. Five of these individuals are not on the authors' list of 73 deceased whose autopsies were observed. To what extent, if at all, these five overlap with the five unidentified deceased on the authors' list we cannot know.
The Commission listed the names of 15 people whose "right to life may have been intentionally violated" (21) . Two of those named were not included on the list of 73 deceased whose autopsies were observed (although of course, they may have been among the unidentified deceased on that list). One of the two was also not on the Public Defender's list of 76 deceased, but this too included some unidentified bodies.
Most of those on the Commission's list of 15 were last seen alive in the custody of the security forces, who were frequently masked, shortly before shots were heard and other circumstances suggested they had been killed. One, GZ 49, was intellectually handicapped and was found to have ten gunshot wounds to the front of his neck, chest, abdomen, and inguinal region, as well as the back of his right forearm and hand. Three (GZ 33, 32, 28) were last seen in a temporary holding area established by the security forces.
In addition, the Commission concluded that… …five other males were very likely murdered in the sight of soldiers #1 and #3 in Sector 1 on 24 May…..we cannot identify these persons, nor can we be sure they are not included in the 15 referred to above (26) .
Mortars were deployed during the operation. This use was regarded by the Commission of Enquiry as "irresponsible and reckless" (27) , and a "serious error of judgement… reckless and wholly disproportionate to the threats offered by gunmen" (28) .
In the Commission's view, with good support from the autopsy reports, two died from (or in one case, perhaps, with) injuries from explosive mortar rounds. In view of the nature of the decision to deploy the mortars, these two deaths are probably also unlawful homicides. In one of the two, there were injuries from firearms as well as injuries suggestive of shrapnel. A history of the death of this individual is given by the Public Defender and refers to a period of conscious survival after being struck by mortar shrapnel with subsequent execution by a soldier: 
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One of the soldiers came over to him and just shot him. It was more than one shot; I heard more than one shot (29) .
The autopsy revealed nine gunshot wounds as well as less serious shrapnel wounds.
With the exception of one death, the security forces provided no evidence of having killed anyone in any circumstances. There was no good evidence that criminal gunmen killed anyone either. This is despite the fact that by May 27, it was clear that about 70 people had been killed, and by May 29 only 29 guns had been recovered.
The security forces argued that many of the dead were gunmen "who embarked on a vicious and violent offensive against the security forces" (30) . The response of the Commission was:
Where were the guns that these deceased were firing? The security forces adduced not a shred of evidence of any guns found near to bodies at any time, and certainly not after 4pm when they were in control of Sectors 1 and 2 (30).
This finding of the Commission is in stark contrast to an earlier expressed view of the Commissioner of Police in a letter to the Minister for National Security in 2013 when he wrote:
Gunmen loyal to Coke murdered 24 citizens in St Catherine alone on May 24 to detain police resources in that area so that the effort to arrest Coke would be abandoned (31).
In the presence of what amounted to significant passive resistance by the security services to the work of the Commission, there was focus on forensic avenues of enquiry. Even in the days following the operation, the Public Defender was very concerned that there seemed to be little or no investigative activity and wrote to the Chief of Police and the Head of the BSI about this.
Injuries to Others
The Commission of Enquiry does not refer to how many civilians were injured.
Twenty-six soldiers were injured -all on May 24. Fourteen had gunshot injuries and a number of these were serious: multiple gunshot wounds to the thigh, inguinal region, and scrotum; to the neck with hemopneumothorax; and a compound fracture to humerus. One soldier suffered a blast injury to the lower leg resulting in an above knee amputation. Five were wounded by shrapnel and four suffered blunt force injuries "in circumstances not made known to us" (32) . Two soldiers suffered heat exhaustion. There was one death of a soldier: a single gunshot wound to the back of the head. The projectile had penetrated his ballistic helmet, indicating that it had been fired from a high-powered rifle. No commissioned officers were injured. The Commission found that all were injured as a result of the actions of the criminal elements trying to protect Coke from arrest (32).
Eight JCF personnel were shot and wounded in the early hours of May 24; two died. No details of the injuries were provided to the Commission, although the circumstances of their occurrence were well understood and were the result of gunfire from criminal elements trying to protect Coke from arrest.
Other Aspects of the Investigation
The BSI was formally handed responsibility by the Chief of Police "to commence investigations without delay" on May 25 (33) . The Commission found that there was no record made of the locations of bodies to assist investigations, nor was there any start made to process possible crime scenes. The officer in charge of the BSI stated that he delegated responsibility in relation to the bodies to two officers. The processing of crime scenes did not commence until ten days after the operation on June 4 (34), because the officer in charge of the Scene of Crimes Unit stated that was when he was first requested to attend.
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Cordner et al. Total number of firearms recovered was 106, and there were considerable discrepancies in these numbers at different times and places. The low number of firearms recovered in light of the number of gunmen led to discussions about gunmen being skilled at concealment and inefficient searches. The overall evidence in relation to recovered firearms was considered to be "unsatisfactory."
Location of Bodies
Data about where specific bodies were found and the presence or not of nearby firearms would be essential for the investigation of the deaths. In fact, there were no records of which bodies were found where, when, or by whom; nor whether firearms were found nearby (37, 38) . Thus the Commission of Enquiry was highly critical of the evidence of those said to be responsible for the collection of the bodies. This lack of information and records contrasted with the expressed view of the Commissioner of Police in a letter to the Minister of National Security in 2013 about the operation. Relative to the JCF's Policy on the Use of Force and Human Rights, humanitarian considerations were a priority in the strategic planning of the operations. These include respect for human rights, removal of injured persons, removal of dead bodies, and protect the dignity of the dead (31).
Field Autopsies
Field autopsies have been a feature of Jamaican forensic pathology practice, in Kingston at least. They occur because of the disinclination of funeral homes (there being no government mortuary) to admit decomposing bodies to their facilities. In those circumstances, an autopsy is performed where the body is found, or nearby.
Amongst the 73 deceased whose autopsies were observed, 18 had undergone a previous field autopsy at the cemetery on May 25 and 26 by one of the pathologists. These had involved an external examination followed by a midline incision and examination of the internal organs in situ. Notes made at the time were later compiled into a report completed, usually, at the police station. The bodies were then placed in coffins and their burial commenced by police. The field autopsies were disrupted by gunfire. There was a community outcry that the authorities were not investigating the deaths properly and trying to minimize the number of deaths. The Public Defender informed the Prime Minister, who ordered the practice to stop. It was not until May 29 that the bodies located at the cemetery were retrieved and taken for storage to the Norman Road temporary mortuary.
Facilities and Processes
On June 11, all bodies were radiographed at the hospital.
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The temporary mortuary established at Norman Road was a blue plastic tent established in what appeared to be a large work yard in suburban Kingston, being used temporarily by a funeral home. A refrigerated container obtained by police had been located there, holding perhaps 20 or so bodies. The container was being maintained by staff of the funeral home, whereas autopsy assistance was being provided by staff of the Medico-Legal Unit. One of us (MM) noticed that the container was only working at night, the refrigeration being turned off by the funeral home during the day to save electricity.
The Spanish Town Hospital Mortuary, where many of the examinations were conducted, was a room about 6.5 square meters. It was entered directly from the outside and had a porcelain autopsy table. The environment was often warm and humid. There was no running water at the autopsy table, such water as there was being delivered by a very thin hose from an adjacent sink, and there was a very small selection of dissecting equipment on a small board. An adjacent refrigerated room for body storage was out of order. Bodies were brought on a daily basis from a private funeral home in Kingston, about 30 to 40 minutes away.
In one case, the deceased was known to be HIV-positive and had died in hospital from Pneumocystis pneumonia about four weeks following the incursion. She had suffered a graze gunshot wound injury requiring only dressing. The pathologist was concerned about undertaking the autopsy. Decomposition meant that the bodies were very slippery, and with rudimentary equipment and no mesh gloves or other personal protective equipment, that meant that the risk of injuring oneself during an autopsy was real. As such, the autopsy did not proceed.
All of these civilian deaths were, technically speaking, deaths in custody and therefore their investigation were covered by the 1991 Minnesota Protocol. The Protocol expects the scene to be secured and protected, detailed photography of the deceased and the scene, and the scene examined and records made. (19) .
The processing of the death/crime scenes was clearly in breach of the Protocol, as it seems not to have happened at all.
The Enquiries
There were four main enquiries into aspects of the operation and its surrounding events. 
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it had a measure of bipartisan support. As evidence, the Prime Minister at the time of the incursion stated that it was always his government's intention to establish such a Commission (10).
4. In May 2010, just before the incursion, Parliament passed The Independent Commission of Investigations Act that established INDECOM. This is a considerably strengthened version of the BSI and the Police Complaints Authority. The latter was scrapped, and the former became an internal agency for police dealing with lesser matters outside the scope of INDECOM. INDECOM commenced operations in August 2010 to improve accountability for the number of shooting deaths at the hands of police. In November 2011, it took over responsibility for investigating the deaths related to the incursion from the BSI.
The main Commission of Enquiry, a truth-finding, inquisitorial mechanism, was appointed on February 21, 2014, almost four years after the event. Its mandate was to investigate the totality of the circumstances before, during, and after the incursion of the JDF and JCF into Tivoli Gardens in their attempt to execute the warrant for the extradition of Coke. Prior to the report being submitted to the Governor of Jamaica in February 2016, 1138 witness statements were considered and 94 people gave oral evidence. The Commission used the civil standard of fact finding; that is, a fact was established on the balance of probabilities. People against whom an adverse finding or comment was made were given an opportunity to respond in advance to that finding. All such responses, and the Commission's further response, were included in the final report. The 493-page report, plus numerous appendices, makes many conclusions including:
1. There were completely inadequate arrangements for emergency medical services (42).
2. The planning for the operations did not include contingencies for dealing with injuries or deaths i.e., it was based on zero injuries (43).
3. The JDF caused most of the damage to the 2520 properties affected including 94 houses totally destroyed and 200 severely damaged (44, 45) .
4. House clearing exercises were heavy handed.
5. The forced detentions immediately following the incursion were wholly disproportionate to the requirements of the situation. Young males were arbitrarily taken and subjected to indignities within Tivoli Gardens before being taken away to detention centres. The fact that 4372 peoplelargely young men -were detained and only 148 not released meant that the detentions were arbitrary (46) . Even during a State of Emergency, it was only lawful to detain people…
…where their behaviour was of such a nature as to give reasonable grounds for suspecting that they were acting or had acted in a manner prejudicial to public safety or were committing or had committed an offence… (47) .
The detentions were illegal, contrary to the Regulations and unconstitutional (47).
6. The security forces did not exercise due caution in protecting residents from injury and property damage (48).
7. There were many instances of theft by the security forces (49).
8. "The majority of the criminal gunmen retreated or escaped" (50).
9. JDF went to some effort to deal with soldiers who misconducted themselves. There was no evidence that the JCF did the same (51) . JDF had a system of supervision allowing detection and punishment of misconduct. The same could not be said of the JCF (52).
10. Members of security forces were wearing masks during the operation (53). Table 5 is a summary of the questions that need to be addressed in evaluating the deaths from the incursion. The state of the forensic contribution is summarized.
CONCLUSION
Set out in
Broadly speaking, the autopsy investigations, but not the scene investigations, were in accordance with the requirements of the Minnesota Protocol (19) . Autopsies assist with understanding the circumstances within which the death occurred. Information about the death scene is almost always necessary to properly understand these circumstances. It seems that there may have been significant deviations from the obligations to investigate crime scenes following the incursion. While the Commission was able to make some conclusions based on eye witness testimony and autopsy findings, the lack of crime scene evidence supported by ballistics, blood spatter, and other DNA blood stain evidence has prevented the Commission of Enquiry from coming to better conclusions about the number of extra-judicial killings. This will also impact the ability to arrest and try members of the security forces for some of these killings, thus reducing accountability for breaches of the right to life that occurred during the Tivoli Gardens incursion. Sixty-eight of 73 deceased whose autopsies were observed were identified. There are additional deceased (both civilians and members of the security forces) who died, before, during or after the incursion, who may or may not have been subject to autopsy.
Where did people sustain injuries in the Tivoli Gardens incursion? Determination of the origin and location of blood stains inside the houses and external environment.
Progress with any blood spatter and/or DNA analysis of the bloodstain samples is not clear, and it seems unlikely that any was undertaken, but if so the results are not publicly available.
How did the people die in the Tivoli Gardens incursion? Determination of the causes of death and the injuries sustained. The observer reports and autopsy reports have been finalized. The causes of death and the injuries sustained have been characterized, within the constraints of variable degrees of decomposition.
Who killed those who died in Tivoli Gardens? Linkage of bullet fragments recovered from bodies to firearms that discharged the bullets.
The fired bullet fragments recovered from bodies have only undergone initial characterization. As far as can be assessed, firearms have not been obtained from the security forces, and if so, no results have been obtained or published publicly.
What were the circumstances surrounding the deaths in Tivoli Gardens?
The goal of the medicolegal investigation of death is to contribute information to enable legal authorities to determine the answer to this question. It is recognized that the protocol needs to be practically achievable within the existing infrastructure and available resources. However, the lack of resources is not considered a barrier to conducting complete post-mortem examinations. v Post-mortem radiographs should be reviewed prior to dissection and all projectiles visible on radiographs should be described. Other radiographic observations should be recorded
v Signs of recent injury should be documented and described -this applies to all injuries that are present v If gunshot wounds are present, the gunshot wounds will be described in an arbitrary order that may not reflect the order of infliction. Wound paths and directions should be described in the anatomical position (upright frontal position with palms facing forward). The gunshot wounds should be described using the standard pro forma v The gunshot wounds should be described in continuity from the entrance wound to the exit wound or from the entrance wound to the site of lodgement of the projectile, as appropriate v Entrance wounds should be described by referring to the location on the body and position (measurement from the top of the head and from the midline). The size and shape should be described. The presence of an abrasion collar, blackening of margin, stippling and other observations should be recorded. An opinion should be proffered on the range of discharge of the firearm v The path of bullet with internal injuries and associated haemorrhage should be described v The volume of hemothoraces or hemoperitoneum should be recorded v Exit wounds should be described by referring to the location on the body and position (measurement from the sole of the feet and from the midline). The size and shape should be described. If the bullet has not exited, the placement of the bullet should be recorded. The projectiles should be described (e.g., deformed, fragmented)
v Where multiple gunshot wounds are present and wound paths associated with entry wounds cannot be uniquely associated with lodged bullets or exit wounds, then entry and exit wounds and bullets do not need to be described in continuity. This is to be done at the discretion of the Government Forensic Pathologist and within the limits of decomposition v All body cavities, i.e. the cranial cavity, thoracic cavity and abdominal cavity must be opened for examination v All dissections and removal of internal organs will be done at the discretion of the Government Forensic Pathologist v A complete musculoskeletal dissection will be performed by the Government Forensic Pathologist in all cases.
v Histology will be performed at the discretion of the Government Forensic Pathologist v Excision of entry wounds will be performed at the discretion of the Government Forensic Pathologist v Samples of body fluids and liver will be collected for toxicology at the discretion of the Government Forensic Pathologist 
